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Red Guards

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Red Guards
FounderChairman Mao
LeadersCultural Revolution Group (until 1968)
Foundation1966
Dissolved1968
CountryChina
AllegianceMao Zedong (ceremonial figurehead)
MotivesPreserving the revolutionary ideology of Mao Zedong and his position within the Chinese Communist Party
Active regionsThroughout much of China, particularly in Beijing and other urban areas
IdeologyMaoism
Political positionFar-left
Notable attacksRed August (including the Daxing Massacre, the Guangxi Massacre, the Inner Mongolia incident; the Guangdong Massacre; the Yunnan Massacres; and the Hunan Massacres)
StatusForcefully suppressed by the PLA
Size11 to 12 million high school and university students, among other followers or supporters[1][2]
Red Guards
Red Guards on Tiananmen Square in Beijing. They were holding the "Little Red Book" containing quotations from Mao Zedong.
Simplified Chinese红卫兵
Traditional Chinese紅衛兵
Hanyu PinyinHóngwèibīng
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinHóngwèibīng
Wade–GilesHung2-wei4-ping1
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingHung4wai6bing1

The Red Guards were a mass, student-led, paramilitary social movement mobilized by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966 until their abolishment in 1968, during the first phase of the Cultural Revolution, which he had instituted.[3]

According to a Red Guard leader, the movement's aims were as follows:

Chairman Mao has defined our future as an armed revolutionary youth organization .... So if Chairman Mao is our Red-Commander-in-Chief and we are his Red Guards, who can stop us? First we will make China Maoist from inside out and then we will help the working people of other countries make the world red ... and then the whole universe.[4]

Despite meeting with resistance early on,[citation needed] the Red Guards received personal support from Mao, and the movement rapidly grew. The movement in Beijing culminated during the "Red August" of 1966, which later spread to other areas in mainland China.[5][6] Mao made use of the group as propaganda and to accomplish goals such as seizing power and destroying symbols of China's pre-communist past ("Four Olds"), including ancient artifacts and gravesites of notable Chinese figures. Moreover, the government was very permissive of the Red Guards, and even allowed the Red Guards to inflict bodily harm on people viewed as dissidents. The movement quickly grew out of control, frequently coming into conflict with authority and threatening public security until the government made efforts to rein the youths in, with even Mao himself finding the leftist students to have become too radical.[7] The Red Guard groups also suffered from in-fighting as factions developed among them. By the end of 1968, the group as a formal movement had dissolved with many of the red guards sent to rural areas and country side due to the Down to the Countryside Movement.

Origins

[edit]
Political slogan by Red Guards on the campus of Fudan University, Shanghai, China says "Defend Central Committee with (our) blood and life! Defend Chairman Mao with (our) blood and life!"
Red Guards in 1966

The first students to call themselves "Red Guards" in China were from the Tsinghua University High School, who were given the name to sign two big-character posters issued on 25 May – 2 June 1966.[8] The students believed that the criticism of the play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office was a political issue and needed greater attention. The group of students – led by Zhang Chengzhi at Tsinghua Middle School and Nie Yuanzi at Peking University – originally wrote the posters as a constructive criticism of Tsinghua University and Peking University's administrations, who were accused of harbouring intellectual elitism and bourgeois tendencies.[9] Most of the early Red Guards came from the so-called "Five Red Categories".[10][11]

The Red Guards were denounced as counter-revolutionaries and radicals by the school administration and by fellow students and were forced to secretly meet amongst the ruins of the Old Summer Palace. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao Zedong ordered that the manifesto of the Red Guards be broadcast on national radio and published in the People's Daily newspaper. This action gave the Red Guards political legitimacy, and student groups quickly began to appear across China.[12] By the end of August 1966, almost every Chinese city and a majority of counties had Red Guard activity.[13] Eighty-five percent of counties had local Red Guard activity by October 1966.[13] According to sociologist Andrew G. Walder, "These figures represent a remarkable level of popular political mobilization. At no point in the previous history of the regime were ordinary citizens permitted, much less encouraged, to form independent political organizations."[13]

Due to the factionalism already emerging in the Red Guard movement, President Liu Shaoqi made the decision in early June 1966 to send in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) work teams.[8] These workgroups were led by Zhang Chunqiao, head of China's Propaganda Department, in an attempt by the Party to keep the movement under control. Rival Red Guard groups led by the sons and daughters of cadres were formed by these work teams to deflect attacks from those in positions of power towards bourgeois elements in society, mainly intellectuals.[12] In addition, these Party-backed rebel groups also attacked students with 'bad' class backgrounds, including children of former landlords and capitalists.[12] These actions were all attempts by the CCP to preserve the existing state government and apparatus.[8]

Mao, concerned that these work teams were hindering the course of the Cultural Revolution, dispatched Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and others to join the Red Guards and combat the work teams.[9] In July 1966, Mao ordered the removal of the remaining work teams (against the wishes of Liu Shaoqi) and condemned their 'Fifty Days of White Terror', a label referencing the period of time the work teams were active.[14] The Red Guards were then free to organize without the restrictions of the Party and, within a few weeks, on the encouragement of Mao's supporters, Red Guard groups had appeared in almost every school in China.[15]

Mao had multiple reasons for supporting the Red Guards' activities, with the primary one being his wish to undermine Liu Shaoqi, with whom he grew increasingly distrustful.[16] Furthermore, Mao intended to make the revolutionary ideals more ingrained in the Chinese youth, as a way to harden their spirit and combat traditional scholarly education.

Chiang Kai-Shek believed Mao lost trust in CCP officials and members, Communist Youth League of China (CYLC) members, and even workers, peasants and soldiers, so he had put faith in the students, and made use of the Red Guards to preserve his authority,[17][unbalanced opinion?] Chiang also believed Mao started the massive purge among knowledgeable and contributive CCP officials and members and CYLC members in the name of Maoism, let Red Guards replace them to inherit the party.[18]

Role in the Cultural Revolution

[edit]

Red August

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A public appearance of Chairman Mao and Lin Biao among Red Guards, in Beijing, during the Cultural Revolution (November 1966)

Mao Zedong expressed personal approval and support for the Red Guards in a letter to the Tsinghua University Red Guards on 1 August 1966.[1] During the "Red August" of Beijing, Mao gave the movement a public boost at a massive rally on 18 August at Tiananmen Square. Mao appeared atop Tiananmen wearing an olive green military uniform, the type favored by Red Guards, but which he had not worn in many years.[1] He personally greeted 1,500 Red Guards and waved to 800,000 Red Guards and onlookers below.[1]

The rally was led by Chen Boda and Lin Biao gave a keynote speech.[1] Red Guard leaders, led by Nie Yuanzi, also gave speeches.[1] A high school Red Guard leader, Song Binbin, placed a red armband inscribed with the characters for "Red Guard" on the chairman, who stood for six hours.[1] The 8-18 Rally, as it was known, was the first of eight receptions the Chairman gave to Red Guards in Tiananmen in the fall of 1966. It was this rally that signified the beginning of the Red Guards' involvement in implementing the aims of the Cultural Revolution.[19]

A second rally, held on 31 August, was led by Kang Sheng and Marshal Lin Biao also donned a red arm band. The last rally was held on 26 November 1966. In all, the Chairman greeted eleven to twelve million Red Guards, most of whom traveled from afar to attend the rallies[1][2] including one held on National Day 1966, which included the usual civil-military parade.

During Red August, large number of members of "Five Black Categories" were persecuted and even killed.[6] Mao had originally instructed the PLA to not interfere against the Red Guards' violence, by vaguely ordering the army to 'support the left'.[16]

Attacks upon the "Four Olds"

[edit]
The remains of Ming dynasty Wanli Emperor at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned.[20]

In August 1966, the 11th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee had ratified the 'Sixteen Articles', a document that stated the aims of the Cultural Revolution and the role students would be asked to play in the movement. After the 18 August rally, the Cultural Revolution Group directed the Red Guards to attack the 'Four Olds' of Chinese society (i.e., old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas). For the rest of the year, Red Guards marched across China in a campaign to eradicate the 'Four Olds'. Old books and art were destroyed, museums were ransacked, and streets were renamed with new revolutionary names, adorned with pictures and the sayings of Mao.[21] Many famous temples, shrines, and other heritage sites in Beijing were attacked.[22]

The Cemetery of Confucius was attacked in November 1966 by a team of Red Guards from Beijing Normal University, led by Tan Houlan.[23][24] The corpse of the 76th-generation Duke Yansheng was removed from its grave and hung naked from a tree in front of the palace during the desecration of the cemetery.[25]

Attacks on other cultural and historic sites occurred between 1966 and 1967. One of the greater damages was to the Ming Dynasty Tomb of the Wanli Emperor in which his and the empress' corpses, along with a variety of artifacts from the tomb, were destroyed by student members of the Red Guard. During the assault on Confucius' tombs alone, more than 6,618 historic Chinese artifacts were destroyed in the desire to achieve the goals of the Cultural Revolution.[26]

Individual property was also targeted by Red Guard members if it was considered to represent one of the Four Olds. Commonly, religious texts and figures would be confiscated and burned. In other instances, items of historic importance would be left in place, but defaced, with examples such as Qin Dynasty scrolls having their writings partially removed, and stone and wood carvings having the faces and words carved out of them.

Re-education came alongside the destruction of previous culture and history; throughout the Cultural Revolution schools were a target of Red Guard groups to teach both the new ideas of the Cultural Revolution as well as to point out what ideas represented the previous era idealizing the Four Olds. For example, one student, Mo Bo, described a variety of the Red Guards activities taken to teach the next generation what was no longer the norms.[27] This was done according to Bo with wall posters lining the walls of schools pointing out workers who undertook "bourgeois" lifestyles. These actions inspired other students across China to join the Red Guard as well. One of these very people, Rae Yang, described how these actions inspired students. Through authority figures, such as teachers, using their positions as a form of absolute command rather than as educators, gave students a reason to believe Red Guard messages.[28] In Yang's case it is exemplified through a teacher using a poorly phrased statement as an excuse to shame a student to legitimize the teacher's own position.[citation needed]

Murder and oppression

[edit]

Attacks on culture quickly descended into attacks on people. Ignoring guidelines in the 'Sixteen Articles' which stipulated that persuasion rather than force were to be used to bring about the Cultural Revolution, officials in positions of authority and perceived 'bourgeois elements' were denounced and suffered physical and psychological attacks.[21] On 22 August 1966, a central directive was issued to stop police intervention in Red Guard activities.[29] Those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled "counter-revolutionaries." Mao's praise for rebellion effectively endorsed the actions of the Red Guards, which grew increasingly violent.[30]

Public security in China deteriorated rapidly as a result of central officials lifting restraints on violent behavior.[31] Xie Fuzhi, the national police chief, said it was "no big deal" if Red Guards were beating "bad people" to death.[32] The police relayed Xie's remarks to the Red Guards and they acted accordingly.[32] In the course of about two weeks, the violence left some 100 teachers, school officials, and educated cadres dead in Beijing's western district alone. The number injured was "too large to be calculated."[31]

The most gruesome aspects of the campaign included numerous incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were targets of 'struggle' could no longer bear the stress and committed suicide. In August and September 1966, there were 1,772 people murdered in Beijing alone. In Shanghai there were 704 suicides and 534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In Wuhan there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period.[33]

Intellectuals were to suffer the brunt of these attacks. Many were ousted from official posts such as university teaching, and allocated manual tasks such as "sweeping courtyards, building walls and cleaning toilets from 7am to 5pm" which would encourage them to dwell on past "mistakes."[34] An official report in October 1966 stated that the Red Guards had already arrested 22,000 'counterrevolutionaries'.[35]

The Red Guards were also tasked with rooting out 'capitalist roaders' (those with supposed 'right-wing' views) in positions of authority. This search was to extend to the very highest echelons of the CCP, with many top party officials, such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Dehuai, being attacked both verbally and physically by the Red Guards.[36] Liu Shaoqi was especially targeted, as he had taken Mao's seat as State Chairman (Chinese President) following the Great Leap Forward. Although Mao stepped down from his post as a sign of accepting responsibility, he was angered that Liu could take the reins of communist China.

Clashes with the PLA

[edit]

The Red Guards were not completely unchallenged. They were not permitted to enter Zhongnanhai, the Forbidden City, or any military facility that was tasked with classified information (i.e. special intelligence, Nuclear Weapons development). Several times, Red Guards attempted to storm Zhongnanhai and the 8341 Special Regiment, which was responsible for Mao's security, fired upon them.[37]

Jiang Qing promoted the idea that the Red Guards should "crush the PLA,"[citation needed] with Lin Biao seemingly supportive of her plans (e.g., permitting Red Guards to loot barracks). At the same time, several military commanders, oblivious to the ongoing chaos that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had to deal with, disregarded their chain of command and attacked Red Guards whenever their bases or people were threatened. When Red Guards entered factories and other areas of production, they encountered resistance in the form of worker and peasant groups who were keen to maintain the status quo.[37] In addition, there were bitter divisions within the Red Guard movement itself, especially along social and political lines. The most radical students often found themselves in conflict with more conservative Red Guards.[2]

The leadership in Beijing also simultaneously tried to restrain and encourage the Red Guards, adding confusion to an already chaotic situation. On the one hand, the Cultural Revolution Group reiterated calls for non-violence. On the other hand, the PLA was told to assist the Red Guards with transport and lodging, and assist in organizing rallies.[2] By the end of 1966, most of the Cultural Revolution Group were of the opinion that the Red Guards had become a political liability.[2] The campaign against 'capitalist roaders' had led to anarchy, the Red Guards' actions had led to conservatism amongst China's workers, and the lack of discipline and the factionalism in the movement had made the Red Guards politically dangerous.[38] 1967 would see the decision to dispel the student movement.

Red Guard press

[edit]

During the early period of the Cultural Revolution, independent publications by mass political organizations such as Red Guards grew, reaching an estimated number as high as 10,000.[39] Publications were not uniform in style or form and ranged from mimeographed tabloids to newspapers printed with professional metal type in broadsheet format.[40] The first Red Guard newspapers, Red Guard News (红卫兵报; Hongweibing bao) and Red Guard (红卫兵; Hongweibing) were published on September 1, 1966.[41]

Red Guard newspapers adopted standard journalistic practices such as publishing editorials and commentator articles, as well as reprinted articles from publications such as People's Daily.[42] Red Guard newspapers contained many articles regarding big-character posters and their function within the information environment of the Cultural Revolution.[43]

A small but significant group of the Red Guard press focused on press criticism.[44] This subset of Red Guard newspapers criticized pre-Cultural Revolution practices and proposed new modes of journalism.[45] For example, a group of journalists from the prestigious newspaper Guangming Daily founded a rebel newspaper called Guangming Battle Bulletin (光明战报; Guangming zhanbao) in which they denounced the press theories of Liu Shaoqi and argued that the proletarian press should be a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[46] Rebel workers at Xinhua News Agency also published newspapers in which they commented and reported on press issues.[44]

Because of their grass roots nature and organic connection with the masses, the Red Guard press was able to exercise public oversight over the Party press.[47]


"Enveloped in a trance of excitement and change," all student Red Guards pledged their loyalty to Chairman Mao Zedong.[3] Many worshipped Mao above everything and this was typical of a "pure and innocent generation," especially of a generation that was brought up under a Marxist party, which discouraged religion altogether. Mao quickly formed an army based on individual interpretations of Mao's statements. All groups pledged loyalty to Mao and claimed to have his best interests in mind, yet they continually engaged in verbal and physical skirmishes throughout the Cultural Revolution, proving that there was no core political foundation at work. These skirmishes were often violent, with rivaling groups obtaining both assault rifles and explosives, as well as utilizing forced imprisonments and widespread torture.[16] This domestic anarchy continued until the second half of the Cultural Revolution, when the 9th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party started civil policies.[citation needed]

Youths from families with party-members and of revolutionary origin joined conservative factions. These factions focused on the socio-political status quo, keeping within their localities and working to challenge existing distributions of power and privilege.[48] Those from the countryside and without ties to the CCP often joined radical groups who sought to change and uproot local government leadership.[49] Among the disputes between Red Guard factions was the bloodline theory advocated by most conservative Red Guard groups in the early period of the Cultural Revolution.[50] Under this political view, the issue of a good class background was a precondition for political participation.[50] Students whose parents had been labeled right wing elements in 1957, for example, were not admitted in groups adhering to the bloodline theory.[51] Although it was quickly politically discredited, the bloodline theory was highly influential and contentious among Red Guards in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution.[52]

The primary goal of the radicals was to restructure existing political and social systems, as supposed "capitalist roaders" were corrupting the Socialist agenda. Primarily influenced by travel and a freer exchange of ideas from different regions of China, more joined the radical, rebel factions of the Red Guards by the second half of the Cultural Revolution.[49]

Some historians, such as Andrew Walder, argue that individuals and their political choices also influenced the development of Red Guard factions across China. Interests of individuals, interactions with authority figures, and social interactions all altered identities to forge factions that would fight for new grievances against "the system".[48]

Suppression by the PLA (1967–1968)

[edit]

By February 1967, political opinion at the center had decided on the removal of the Red Guards from the Cultural Revolution scene in the interest of stability.[53] The PLA forcibly suppressed the more radical Red Guard groups in Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Fujian, and Hubei provinces in February and March. Students were ordered to return to schools; student radicalism was branded 'counterrevolutionary' and banned.[54] These groups, as well as many of their supporters, were later branded May Sixteenth elements after an ultra-left Red Guard organization based in Beijing.[citation needed]

May Sixteenth elements (五一六分子) were named after the so-called May Sixteenth Army Corps (五一六兵团; 1967–1968), ultra-left Red Guards in Beijing during the early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) who targeted Zhou Enlai with the backing of Jiang Qing. The name came from the historic May 16 Notice (五一六通知) which Mao Zedong partially wrote and edited, which triggered the revolution. However, Mao was concerned with its radicalism, so in late 1967 the group was outlawed on conspiracy and anarchism charges, followed by the arrest of most Cultural Revolution Group members (except Jiang Qing). Mao became increasingly frustrated with the Red Guards' perceived inability to cooperate, which was the ongoing cause of constant violence. This eventually led to chairman's decision to call on the PLA to reestablish order.[16] A nationwide campaign was later launched to liquidate "May Sixteenth Elements", which created further chaos.[citation needed]

There was a wide backlash in the spring against the suppression, with student attacks on any symbol of authority and PLA units, but not on Marshal Lin Biao, the Minister of National Defense and one of the Chairman's biggest allies. An order from Mao, the Cultural Revolution Group, the State Council, and the Central Military Affairs Committee of the PLA on 5 September 1967 instructed the PLA to restore order to China and end the chaos.[55] The order came within months of incidents of PLA forces disobeying government and CRG orders during the summer (the most extreme case being the Wuhan incident, where the Wuhan Military Region under Chen Zaidao went further than cracking down on Red Guards to arrest the Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi), the aftermath of these resulted in even more violence amongst the Red Guards, even targeting local level PLA formations, raising fears of a repeat of the Wuhan events and other similar ones.[citation needed]

The PLA violently put down the national Red Guard movement in the year that followed, with the suppression often brutal. A radical alliance of Red Guard groups in Hunan province, called the Shengwulian, was involved in clashes with local PLA units, for example, and in the first half of 1968 was forcibly suppressed.[56] At the same time the PLA carried out mass executions of Red Guards in Guangxi province that were unprecedented in the Cultural Revolution.[56]

The final remnants of the movement were defeated in Beijing in the summer of 1968. Allegedly, Mao had an audience with the Red Guard leaders, during which the Chairman informed them of himself being directly responsible for the orders to suppress them, in favor of the military's administration.[16] After the summer of 1968 some more-radical students continued to travel across China and play an unofficial part in the Cultural Revolution, but by then the movement's official and substantial role was over.

Rustication

[edit]

From 1962 to 1979, 16 to 18 million youths were sent to the countryside to undergo re-education.[57][58]

Sending city students to the countryside was also used to defuse the student fanaticism set in motion by the Red Guards. On 22 December 1968, Chairman Mao directed the People's Daily to publish a piece entitled "We too have two hands, let us not laze about in the city", which quoted Mao as saying "The intellectual youth must go to the country, and be educated from living in rural poverty." In 1969 many youths were rusticated.[59]

Economic positions

[edit]

Among the economic positions some Red Guards supported was the abolishment of interest.[60]: 38 

The majority of the workers in the Shanghai branch of the People's Bank of China were Red Guards and they formed a group called the Anti-Economy Liaison Headquarters within the branch.[60]: 38  The Anti-Economy Liaison Headquarters dismantled economic organizations in Shanghai, investigated bank withdrawals, and disrupted regular bank service in the city.[60]: 38 

Monuments

[edit]

Due to the sensitive nature of this part of Chinese history, most Red Guard cemeteries were demolished prior to 2007. The Red Guard Cemetery in People's Park (人民公园) in Shapingba District, Chongqing commemorates a group of the Red Guard called the 815.[61] In December 2009 that cemetery was made the first Cultural Revolution relic to be formally recognized for its cultural heritage site.[62][63]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c d e f g h Ni, Tianqi (7 April 2011). "毛主席八次接见红卫兵的组织工作" [Organization of Chairman Mao's eight receptions with the Red Guards]. people.com.cn (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 1 October 2018. Retrieved 27 December 2011.
  2. ^ a b c d e Meisner, p. 340
  3. ^ a b Teiwes
  4. ^ Chong, Woei Lien (2002). China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0742518742 – via Google Books.
  5. ^ Wang, Youqin (2001). "Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966" (PDF). The University of Chicago. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 April 2020.
  6. ^ a b Jian, Guo; Song, Yongyi; Zhou, Yuan (2006). Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0-8108-6491-7. Archived from the original on 11 June 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2020.
  7. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick; Schoenhals, Michael (2006). Mao's Last Revolution. The Belknap Press. ISBN 978-0674023321.
  8. ^ a b c Chesneaux, p. 141
  9. ^ a b Jiaqi, Yan; Gao Gao (1996). Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution. University of Hawaii Press. pp. 56–64. ISBN 0-8248-1695-1. Archived from the original on 13 October 2022. Retrieved 3 December 2020.
  10. ^ Tanigawa, Shinichi (2007). Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Shaanxi, 1966–1971. Stanford University. ISBN 978-0-549-06376-6. Archived from the original on 13 October 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  11. ^ Singer, Martin (2020). Educated Youth and the Cultural Revolution in China. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-03814-5. Archived from the original on 13 October 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  12. ^ a b c Meisner, p. 334
  13. ^ a b c Walder, Andrew G. (2019). Agents of disorder : inside China's Cultural Revolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-674-24363-7. OCLC 1120781893.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  14. ^ Meisner, p. 335
  15. ^ Meisner, p. 366
  16. ^ a b c d e Lieberthal, Kenneth (2004). Governing China: from revolution through reform (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. pp. 112–116. ISBN 978-0-393-92492-3.
  17. ^ Chiang, Kai-Shek (9 October 1966). "中華民國五十五年國慶日前夕告中共黨人書" [Manifesto to the CPC Members on the Eve of the National Day of the 55th Years of the Republic of China]. 總統蔣公思想言論總集 (in Traditional Chinese). 中正文教基金會 (Chungcheng Cultural and Educational Foundation). Archived from the original on 20 July 2021. Retrieved 11 March 2021. 今天很明白的事實,就是毛澤東對於你們這一代,從黨政軍領導幹部到黨員團員及其所謂工農兵群眾,根本上都不敢相信,認為都已不可靠了,所以它不得不寄望下一代無知的孩子們,組訓「紅衛兵」來保衛它個人生命,來保衛它獨夫暴政、生殺予奪的淫威特權。 [Today, it is a very clear fact that Mao Zedong does not trust your generation, from the party, government and military leaders and cadres to the party members and their so-called workers, peasants and soldiers, and considers all of them unreliable. Therefore, it has to look to the next generation of ignorant children to organize and train the "Red Guard Soldiers" to protect its personal life, and its tyrannical, murderous, and despotic authority.]
  18. ^ Chiang, Kai-Shek (9 October 1966). "中華民國五十五年國慶日前夕告中共黨人書" [Manifesto to the CPC Members on the Eve of the National Day of the 55th Years of the Republic of China]. 總統蔣公思想言論總集 (in Traditional Chinese). 中正文教基金會 (Chungcheng Cultural and Educational Foundation). Retrieved 6 October 2023. 這次毛澤東「文化大革命」的真相,照著它「文化革命小組」所說的,就是要「拿毛澤東思想做方向盤」,要「活學活用毛澤東思想」,要「讀毛的書,聽毛的話,照毛的指示辦事」,來做它救亡掙扎中的萬應靈方。其實就是要用其所謂「毛澤東思想」做招魂牌,對其黨政軍人員來整風——整黨,整政,和整軍。拆穿來說,就是要將你們凡是有知識、有思想、過去有功績、有貢獻的共黨幹部和一般黨員團員,藉此來整肅清除,等待「紅衛兵」來替代你們做它毛澤東的共產黨「接班人」。 [The truth of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution at this time, as what its "Cultural Revolution Group" said, will be "Using Mao Zedong Thought as steering wheel", will "Flexibly learn and use Maoism", will "Read Mao's book, listen Mao's speech, do anything follow Mao's instruction", to do its almighty prescription for salvation. In fact is using its "Mao Zedong Thought" as spirit evocation sign, to rectificate its party, politician and military personnels — rectificating party, rectificating politics, rectificating military. In directly speech, it's intended to purge you the CCP officials and ordinary CCP and CYLC members altogether who have knowledges, ideologies, have merits and contributions in the past in this name, waiting for "Red Guards" to replace you to be successors in Mao Zedong's Communist Party.]
  19. ^ Van der Sprenkel, p. 455
  20. ^ Melvin, Shelia (7 September 2011). "China's Reluctant Emperor". New York Times. Archived from the original on 24 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2017.
  21. ^ a b Meisner, p. 339
  22. ^ Joseph Esherick; Paul Pickowicz; Andrew George Walder (2006). The Chinese cultural revolution as history. Stanford University Press. p. 92. ISBN 0-8047-5350-4.
  23. ^ Ma, Aiping; Si, Lina; Zhang, Hongfei (2009), "The evolution of cultural tourism: The example of Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius", in Ryan, Chris; Gu, Huimin (eds.), Tourism in China: destination, cultures and communities, Routledge advances in tourism, Taylor & Francis US, p. 183, ISBN 978-0-415-99189-6
  24. ^ "Asiaweek article". Asiaweek. 3 January 1984. Archived from the original on 13 October 2022. Retrieved 16 October 2016 – via Google Books.
  25. ^ Jeni Hung (5 April 2003). "Children of Confucius". The Spectator. Archived from the original on 14 June 2016. Retrieved 4 March 2007.
  26. ^ "Burn, loot and pillage! Destruction of antiques during China's Cultural Revolution". AFC China. 10 February 2013. Archived from the original on 14 May 2020. Retrieved 10 April 2017.
  27. ^ Bo, Lo (April 1987). "I Was a Teenage Red Guard". New Internationalist Magazine. Archived from the original on 10 April 2017. Retrieved 10 April 2017.
  28. ^ Yang, Rae (1997). Spider Eaters. University of California Press. p. 116.
  29. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 124
  30. ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 515
  31. ^ a b MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 126
  32. ^ a b MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 125
  33. ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 124
  34. ^ Howard, p. 169.
  35. ^ Karnow, p. 209
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Further reading

[edit]
  • Chan, A; 'Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation'; University of Washington Press (1985)[ISBN missing]
  • Chesneaux, J; 'China: The People's Republic Since 1949'; Harvester Press (1979)[ISBN missing]
  • Howard, R; "Red Guards are always right". New Society, 2 February 1967, pp. 169–170.
  • Karnow, S; 'Mao and China: Inside China's Cultural Revolution'; Penguin (1984)[ISBN missing]
  • Meisner, M; 'Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic Since 1949'; Free Press (1986)
  • Teiwes, F; "Mao and His Followers". A Critical Introduction to Mao Zedong; Cambridge University Press (2010) [ISBN missing]
  • Van der Sprenkel, S; The Red Guards in perspective. New Society, 22 September 1966, pp. 455–456.
  • Walder, A; 'Fractured Rebellion: the Beijing Red Guard Movement'; Harvard University Press (2009)